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Advances in technology can affect production costs which
in turn can be affected by a contractor's financial
condition. The purpose of this thesis is to test the
relationships between advances in technology, production
costs and financial conditions of contractors. The analysis
is conducted using data from a sample of satellite systems.
This thesis describes the relationships between
technology and production cost with the goal of developing a
model which can be used for projecting production cost as
technology advances. The findings indicate that production
cost is significantly associated with measures of technology
and with measures of development cost. The relationships
identified lay the foundation for projecting production cost.
This thesis also examines relationships between control
over production cost by contractors and their financial
condition. The analysis suggests that aspects of financial
condition may be indicators of a contractors ability to
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The purpose of this thesis is to determine the
relationships between advances in technology, production
costs and financial conditions of contractors. The analysis
is conducted using data for a sample of fourteen complex
satellite systems.
This thesis topic was selected as an extension of a
project completed by Dr. Willis R. Greer, Jr. [Ref. 1]. His
project analyzed the relationships between measures of
technology (and technology advance) and research and
development costs. This thesis will conduct a similar
analysis but emphasize relationships between technology and
production costs as technologies advance. Additionally, this
thesis will document the relationships between control of




Dr. Greer's study examined the techniques currently
available for costing state-of-the-art (SOA) extension
contracts by surveying literature dealing explicitly with SOA
measurement and costing. As there was general recognition
that the cost of an SOA extension relates to the scale of the
undertaking, most of the research done to date has
concentrated on measuring the amount of SOA extension
1
represented by a sample set of efforts. The study employed
various techniques to combine design variables in an effort
to produce a single measure of the SOA for a given system.
Dr. Greer also studied the direct relationship between
the scale of an SOA extension and development cost, with
disappointing results. He discovered that cost estimates
made early in the life of a project were plagued with error;
therefore the focus of his study was to develop a cost
estimating model that was demonstrably workable for both
prediction and cost control uses.
In Dr. Greer's study, eighteen variables or composite
variables that could be used to describe satellite technology
were identified. A factor analysis was then run with eleven
of the eighteen variables factored in its final form. They
clustered onto four factors with 81.7* of the variance
explained. These four factors were used to describe basic
dimensions of technology.
His next step was to calculate factor scores for each of
the eighteen systems in the data set. An ellipsoid model was
then fit to the factor scores and used to determine a summary
measure of the level of technology embodied in each
satellite. The technology embodied in individual satellites
was measured by the radial distance from the origin.
Dr. Greer's purpose of developing SOA measures was to
facilitate prediction of the cost of developing new
technological systems, which is a necessary initial step in
2
any attempt to control costs. His next step was therefore to
search for statistical associations between (A) the degree to
which a system's technology is extended and (B) the level of
activity required to bring this extension about.
The technological objective of a development project and
the technology SOA of the closest existing satellite were
used to identify the development task by referencing the
technological distance separating the two. Three more
detailed measurement concepts were then developed: reach
,
advance , and redesign . Reach measures the total technological
complexity, or the overall ambition of the project. Advance
represents the "invention" aspects or the "true" SOA progress
required [Ref. 1:P.V.]. The redesign portion represents a
movement parallel to an old SOA surface, which reflects a
tradeoff between different dimensions of technology.
Testing the Time Hypothesis
The first hypothesis that Dr. Greer tested was that the
difficulty of the development task, as measured by the time
required for its completion , is a function of the three
measures of technological spread. His results were:
Time = 52.86+218.93 Advance-34 . 28 Redesign-17 . 37 Reach
t statistics (3.69) (1.45) (0.47)
Significance .001 .085 .322
Variance explained (R2) .791
Adjusted R2 .728
Standard error of the estimate 8.745
3
The regression results were highly significant. Advance was
by far the most important determinant of development time.
Neither redesign nor reach were statistically significant.
Cost Prediction Hypothesis
Dr. Greer then hypothesized that development cost would
be a function of development time. Additionally, he argued
that cost would not be a smooth function of development time.
If a program takes longer then its intended completion date,
it becomes more expensive to compress the required
accomplishment into an increasingly smaller time horizon. He
thus postulated that there is a "natural" project time, and
that the residuals from this natural time may influence cost.
Again, his multiple regression produced good results,
Cost = -61357+4793.1 Predicted time+7391.4 Residual Time
t statistics (3.12) (2.47)
Significance .004 .013
Variance explained (R 2 ) .590
Adjusted R2 .516
Standard error of the estimate 82647
Cost Control
In order to control costs, the variances between
predicted and actual costs must be explained. The
regressions developed by Dr. Greer provided a basis for doing
so
.
He first used advance, redesign and reach in the "time"
regression to predict the time that would be required for the
system's development. The predicted time was then input to
the "cost" regression (with the residual set to zero) to
provide an ex ante prediction of development cost.
His next step was to compare the actual time for the
project to the predicted time in order to determine the
residual . He then used the cost regression again in order to
calculate a new cost estimate considering the residual time
for the project. The difference between the ex ante cost
estimate and the cost estimate based on the project's actual
time was termed the "variance due to time" or the portion of
the total variance that can be attributed to the cost
consequences of time delays.
Actual cost was then compared with the cost estimate
based on actual time to determine a "cost control variance"
.
This variance indicates the quality of cost control for the
project. The resulting data will be presented and further
explained in Chapter II.
This thesis will differ from Dr. Greer's study in two
respects
:
1. Dr. Greer's analysis considered the "development
costs" of each system. This analysis will consider
"production costs" of each system. Production cost data for
fourteen individual systems was obtained and an attempt was
made to explain production cost using variables that were
5
derived in Dr. Greer's study. The central focus of the
thesis is to explain production cost in terms of two sets of
available variables: (A) a set reflecting technology and its
extension (advance, redesign, and reach) and, (B) a set
reflecting aspects of cost and cost control during
development. I have hypothesized that because technological
advance represents mainly the "invention" aspect of a
project, it will have only a limited relationship to
production costs.
An attempt will be made to explain production cost using
development costs and estimated costs derived through
regression analysis. I have hypothesized that as development
costs increase production costs will also increase, as high
development costs may indicate a more complex system
resulting in increased production costs.
2. This thesis will also create measures of cost control
(cost overruns and cost underruns) by comparing actual
production costs with production costs predicted on the basis
of the known technology and development cost measures. This
data will then be compared with measures of contractor
financial condition (e.g. financial ratios) designed to
reflect aspects of contractor financial status and financial
health. Financial data has been obtained for most of the
satellite systems tested and based on that data, I have
hypothesized that a company in good financial health will
have better cost control and will thus have a better chance
of eliminating cost overruns.
C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Two research methodologies, archival and analytical, will
be used to develop and analyze the data presented in this





Archival Research, in the form of literature review,
will be conducted in order to develop a methodology for
measuring the degree of technology in a system and advances
in technology beyond that embodied in predecessor systems.
Additionally, literature review will be conducted to develop
a means of predicting production costs as a function of a
system's technology and advance in technology.
A financial statement review will then be conducted
in order to develop measures of contractor financial
condition. These measures will be designed to reflect
aspects of contractor financial status and financial health,
to be used in developing hypotheses stating expected
relationships between financial condition and cost control.
2 Analytical Research
Analytical research utilizing inductive and
deductive reasoning will be used to develop hypotheses and
analyze the data. Statistical procedures, such as regression
and correlation, will be used to test hypotheses.
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION
The following is an organizational outline and
description of the remaining chapters:
Chapter II will provide a detailed review of Dr. Greer's
study. His methods of sample and data collection will be
explained, followed by a detailed description of his
procedures for arriving at technology measures of advance,
redesign and reach. His hypotheses will again be discussed,
as well as an explanation of the derived variances between
predicted and actual development costs. The chapter will
conclude with a presentation of Dr. Greer's data to be used
for further hypotheses testing in Chapter III.
Chapter III will report results of testing of hypotheses
about associations between measures of production costs and
measures of technology. Regression analysis will be used for
testing hypotheses and for constructing measures of predicted
production costs as a function of measures of technology and
development costs. This chapter will also contain a
discussion of cost control through comparison of actual
production costs with predicted production costs. The
resulting cost overruns and cost underruns will be used for
hypotheses testing in Chapter V.
Chapter IV will discuss the expected relationships
between cost control and contractor financial conditions.
The use of financial ratios to represent contractor financial
condition will be discussed. The meaning and calculation of
specific ratios will be described as well as the possible
effects on cost control. The chapter will conclude with a
presentation of financial ratios accumulated from satellite
system contractors from the year in which the project was
contracted
.
Chapter V will report the results of testing hypotheses
between cost control and contractor financial condition.
Through graphing and correlation, this chapter will determine
if cost overruns/underruns are associated with financial
ratios
.
Chapter VI will summarize conclusions from the tested
hypotheses and offer recommendations.
II. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS: A REVIEW OF DR. GREER'S STUDY
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will provide a detailed review of Dr.
Greer's study. Specifically: Dr. Greer's methods of sample
and data collection and procedures he used to arrive at
technology measures of advance, redesign and reach. The
chapter will conclude with a presentation of new measures of
production costs to be used for hypothesis testing in Chapter
III.
B. METHODS OF SAMPLE AND DATA COLLECTION
TABLE 2 .
1
RELEVANT SATELLITE DEVELOPMENT COST DATA
Min Dist R&D Cost Devel
System Predecessor FY 86$ Time(mo) Advance Redesign Reach
H G 73594 ,4 25 0,,01947 0,.37529 0,,76986
F 116580.,0 27 0,,02398 0,,41191 0,,93837
L H 37228 ,4 32 0,.01076 0,.26210 0,.78737
J H 155522,,8 46 0. , 10584 0,.44910 0,,93328
N F 32585 . 5 28 0,.00719 0, . 10878 0,,91366
M H 319498,,7 37 0,,03647 0. , 17506 0,,82829
B H 91707,.4 37 0,.05194 0,,27101 0,.85233
Q F 64383, , 3 37 -0.,01799 0.,25978 0,,87590
P 121932 .3 33 -0,.02440 0, . 13829 0,,90234
E L 108084, , g 37 0.,00867 0,,09139 0,,80131
K N 14943 .2 36 0,,05180 0,,21674 0,,98883
R P 180652
,
,8 56 0, , 18031 0, , 21766 1,,15432
C M 157820 .4 64 0,,22497 0,,38644 1
,
,14932




The relevant portion of data from Dr. Greer's analysis is
shown above. Of the original eighteen systems, four were
omitted because relevant cost data were unavailable. The
development of the three technology measures (advance,
redesign and reach) - to be described below - were based on
all eighteen systems.
These remaining fourteen systems represent satellites
launched between 1966 and 1986, with letters assigned
randomly for identification. The reported cost figures are
"nonrecurring" development costs provided by the Air Force
for each system. The costs have been adjusted to constant
1986 dollars by using the OSD 3600 Escalation Index of prices
for development work. The "time" column reports the time
elapsed, in months, from awarding the contract to the first
launch of the satellite. (The minimum distance predecessor
will be explained later). The figures for advance, redesign
and reach were calculated by Dr. Greer using a multi-step
procedure as follows.
He selected variables that describe technology embedded
in satellites. Data describing 85 technical characteristics
were available [Ref. l:p. 47]. Some of the 85 properties
included in the data set were considered design objectives,
but others were by-products of the design. Therefore, Dr.
Greer relied on technical expertise in identifying and
reconstructing relevant variables. Through conferences with
technical experts, consensus identification of the following
11
eighteen variables or composite variables to be used to
describe satellite technology was achieved:
Attitude Control System (ACS) variables:
ACS1—Reciprocal of Pointing accuracy
ACS2--Primary stabilization method
ACS 3—Maneuverabi 1 i ty





Electrical power systems variables:
EPSl--Battery capacity
EPS2--Beginning of life power/Array area,
compensated for stabilization and array deployment
EPS3--Array topology




QUALS--Quality percent class S
APOGEE—Orbital apogee *Design life* {% Quality S+0.8 %
Quality B) / 10000





THERM—Max temperature - Min temperature
Tracking Telemetry Control variable:
TTC—Autonomous operating days
The eighteen variables were determinable for each of the
satellites with one exception; THERM was missing for
satellite R, but the mean value of THERM was inserted to
avoid distorting later portions of the analysis.
Values of all eighteen variables for all satellites were
then loaded into an SPSS* data file. A factor analysis was
then run resulting in high coefficients of variation and many
significant correlations [Ref. l:pp. 53, 54].
Dr. Greer determined that the number of variables should
be reduced to enable a more meaningful analysis of the data.
Accordingly, he selectively eliminated some of the eighteen
variables. STRUC was eliminated because the engineers felt
some of the data was incorrect . The seventeen remaining
variables were then subjected to a principal components
factor analysis using the varimax procedure for orthogonal
rotation [Ref. l:p. 52]. Variables with large (greater than
0.5) negative loadings were eliminated. This eliminated
DESIGN, ASC3 and EPS2 . He than eliminated QUALS because it
had no substantial factor loading. The remaining thirteen
13
variables were factored again and clustered nicely onto four
factors with 78.5* of the variance explained. He than
attempted to maximize the percentage of variance explained.
He found that by eliminating ASCI and TTC but retaining
LAUNCH the variance explained reached a maximum of 81.7*.
Factor Interpretation
Dr. Greer's conclusions as to the nature of the four
factors that describe technology embedded in a satellite were
as follows:
He described FACTOR 1 as MISSION . To describe mission,
the requirements were specified in terms of APOGEE, LIFE,
COMM and LAUNCH:
APOGEE-- (Orbital apogee *Design life* (^Quality S+
0.8* Quality B) /10000)—Add to LIFE a
description of the required apogee and quality
levels, in percentages S and B.
LIFE—What must the design life of the satellite be?
COMM--While the variable is actually required power for
communications equipment, it should be easily
estimable from mission specifications.
LAUNCH—How will the satellite be launched?
FACTOR 2 was described as an indirect measure ORBITAL . The
apogee kick motor was used in obtaining the correct orbit.
It was determined that if the designer knows the MISSION, the
launch method and the required apogee and shape of the orbit,
14





FACTOR 3 was determined to be an indirect description of
the electrical power system technology.
EPS3—Array topology.
EPS1—Battery capacity
ACS2--Pr imary stabilization method. Dr. Greer
determined this to be integrally related to array topology
due to its implications for array deployment, he therefore
combined these three variables to make up a single factor
labeled ELECTRICAL POWER .
FACTOR 4 was described as ENVIRONMENT with the following
two environmental variables on this factor:
THERM--Max temperature - Min temperature.
NHARD--Nuclear hardening.
The following summary of the four factors describe the
technology embedded in a satellite and account for 81.7% of
the variance in the sample:
FACTOR LABEL VARIABLES
1 MISSION APOGEE, LIFE, COMM, LAUNCH
2 ORBITAL AKM2, AKM1
3 ELECTRICAL POWER EPS3 , ACS2 , EPS1
4 ENVIRONMENT THERM, NHARD
15
C. MEASURES OF TECHNOLOGY
Dr. Greer's next step was to construct a table of factor
scores for all eighteen systems. The SPSS* regression method




SYSTEM FACT 1 FACT 2 FACT 3 FACT 4
A 0.5481 1 .4894 1 .4514 1.3038
B -0.7021 -0.6149 0.8253 -0.8771
C 1.4523 -1.1906 0.3233 2.3646
D -0.2591 1 .1941 0.8042 0.0857
E -0.8919 -0.7342 0.4668 -0.6761
F -0.5195 0.6648 -1 .3337 0.8363
G -0.2870 -1.3133 -1.7576 0.8937
H 0.4619 -0.8923 -0.4650 -1.1932
I 2 . 1776 -1 .0966 0.4696 -0.3093
J -1 . 4171 -1 .0918 1 .5999 -0.0233
K -1 .0725 0.9872 0.2058 0.4739
L -0.9641 -0.6474 0.0670 -0. 2184
M -0.1629 -0.8299 0.2157 -0.4064
N -1 . 1595 0.7442 -1.0434 1 .0676
0.6814 0.9718 -0.4915 -1 .6992
P 0. 1755 0.7231 -0.4819 -0.8667
Q 0.7529 . 4861 -1 .7235 -0.4232
R 1 .1859 1 .1505 0.8674 -0.3126
The figures for advance, redesign and reach (Table 2.1)
were calculated from the four factor scores above through
construction of an ellipsoid model developed by E.N. Dodson
[Ref. 2:pp. 391-408]. Using the four factor scores as basic
16
technology variables, an ellipsoid of the following form was
fit to the data:
X 2 +X 2 +X 2 +X 212 3 4





Ai=Parameters determined by the ellipsoid fitting
procedure. The result was a hypersurface in 4-dimensional
space which represented the "average" SOA for the sample of
satellites
.
The level of SOA technology embodied in each satellite
was then determined by inserting the factor scores for each
satellite into the industry technology ellipsoid model. The
technology measure for each satellite was then described as
the distance from the origin to the data point and is a
function of the four distinct measured scores.
A general measurement concept was then defined, called
technology distance, which permits the measurement of
distance between any two points within an N-dimensional
space. Using this idea of technology distance, Dr. Greer
created the measures advance, redesign and reach (Table 2.1)
relevant to capturing technology complexity and extension.
Reach represented the total technological complexity embodied
in an individual satellite and was measured as the distance
17
from the origin to the point (in 4-dimensional space) held by
each individual satellite. Advance represented the increment
in technology from a predecessor satellite to the next one.
Advance was measured as the difference in reach between a
satellite and its predecessor. Redesign represented
tradeoffs made in the design process between the four
dimensions of technology. Redesign was measured in terms of
a lateral shift along a technology SOA hypersurface
.
D. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TECHNOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT COST
Dr. Greer's first hypothesis was that development time
depends on the technological complexity of the task. He ran
a multiple regression of development time to advance,
redesign and reach. The result was:
Time = 52.86+218.93 Advance-34 . 28 Redesign-17 . 37 Reach
t statistics (3.69) (1.45) (0.47)
Significance .001 .085 .322
Variance explained (R 2 ) .791
Adjusted R2 .728
Standard error of the estimate 8.745
Dr. Greer's results indicate that advance was the most
important determinant of development time and neither
redesign nor reach was statistically significant. Table 2.3
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Figure 2 . 1 Predicted Versus Actual Development Time in Months
Dr. Greer's second hypothesis revolved around the fact
that development cost may not be a smooth function of
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development time. If a program takes longer than intended,
it may be more costly to accomplish the required project in
less time. He therefore took the predicted times as the
natural time to complete a project and the residuals as
departures from natural time to come up with the following
hypothesis
:
Development Cost = f( Predicted time, Residual) where
Residual = Actual time - Predicted time. The result was:
Cost = -61357+4793.1 Predicted Time+7391.4 Residual
t statistics (3.12) (2.47)
Significance .004 .031
Variance explained (R 2 ) .590
Adjusted R2 .516









DCOST 70000 140000 210000 280000
350000
Figure 2.2 Plot of Predicted Versus Actual Cost in
Thousands of Dollars
Dr. Greer's next step was to explain variances between




Ex Ante Cost Est Variance Cost
Cost Based on Due to Actual Control Total
'stem Est Actual Time Time Cost Variance Variance
H 86693 .
6
43171.8 -43521.8 73594.4 30422.6 -13099.2
71378.8 66256.4 -5122.4 116580.0 50323.6 45201.2
L 94692.3 90575.8 -4116.5 37228.4 -53347.4 -57463.9
J 105629.1 55081.5 -50547 .
6
32585.5 -22496.0 -73043 .
6
N 151593.0 163210.9 11617.9 155522.8 -7688 .
1
3929.8
M 132567.0 107001.7 -25565.2 319498.7 212497.0 186931.7
B 131031.5 107834 .
1
-23197.4 91707.4 -16126.7 -39324.1
Q 57540.8 147671.9 90131.1 64383.3 -83288.6 6842 .
5
P 68571.3 112126.8 43555.5 121934.3 9805.5 53361.0
21
TABLE 2.4 (cont'd)
E 119390.3 114144.5 -5245.8 108084.9 -6059.6 -11305.4
K 128438.5 101848.3 -26590.3 14943.2 86905.1 -113495.3
R 249372.7 184120.6 -65252.1 180652.8 -3467.8 -68719.9
C 268926.2 232652.4 -36273.8 157820.4 -74832.0 -111105.8
I 259983.1 400111.4 140128.3 451274.0 51162.6 191290.9
1. The individual system's values for advance, redesign
and reach were entered in the "time" regression to predict
system development time.
2. The predicted time was input into the "cost"
regression to calculate the ex ante prediction of development
cost
.
3. Actual time was compared to predicted time to
determine residual. The cost regression was again used with
values for both variables to construct a new cost estimate
considering actual time residual of the project in order to
produce the "Cost Est Based on Actual Time" column.
The difference between ex ante cost estimate and cost
estimate based on actual time was termed "Variance Due to
Time" . This figure was determined to be the best estimate of
the portion of total variance attributed to cost consequences
of time delays where negative figures are favorable and
positive figures are unfavorable.
The difference between actual cost and cost estimate
based on actual time was termed "Cost Control Variance" with
a negative figure again being favorable.
22
Total variance is therefore the combined total of the two
variances
.
Dr. Greer's results indicate an unfavorable cost variance
due to time for programs P and I (timing problems) and and
M (cost control problems). His results indicate a favorable
total cost variance for programs J (good timing) and L and K
(good cost control). Project Q had an unfavorable variance
due to time but a favorable cost control variance which
resulted in the total cost variance being an insignificant
amount
.
E. NEW MEASURES OF PRODUCTION COSTS
Relevant Satellite Production Cost Data




DATA FOR PRODUCTION COST HYPOTHESES TESTING
Min Dist Prod Cost Devel
System Predecessor FY 86$ Time (mo) Advance Redesign Reach
H G 50414.0 25 0.01947 0.37529 0.76986
F 142662.0 27 0.02398 0.41191 0.93837
L H 23144.1 32 0.01076 0.26210 0.78737
J H 118752.3 46 0.10584 0.44910 0.93328




37 0.03647 0.17506 0.82829
B H 93931.8 37 0.05194 0.27101 0.85233
Q F 84144.1 37 -0.01799 0.25978 0.87590
P 169721.8 33 -0.02440 0.13829 0.90234
E L 162283.0 37 0.00867 0.09139 0.80131
K N 17697.0 36 0.05180 0.21674 0.98883
R P 594167.0 56 0.18031 0.21766 1.15432
C M 93730.0 64 0.22497 0.38644 1.14932
I H 311833.0 86 0.18782 0.25399 1.04977
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All data columns are the same as Table 2.1 with the
exception of "Prod Cost FY86$". These reported production
cost figures are "nonrecurring" production costs provided by
the Air Force for each system, adjusted to constant 1986
dollars by using the OSD 3020 Escalation Index of prices for
production work. Although not analyzed by Dr. Greer, the
production cost data will be central to the further analysis
in this thesis.
F . SUMMARY
This chapter has reviewed the previous analysis
conducted by Dr. Greer. The first purpose of the chapter was
to outline steps Dr. Greer conducted in: (A) developing
technology measures and; (B) analyzing the relationships
between technology extension and development costs. The
second purpose of the chapter was to present the data for
several variables that will be used in later chapters. Dr.
Greer's analysis has provided three measures of technology or
technology extension (advance, redesign, and reach), three
measures of development cost (actual, ex ante, and estimated
based on actual time) and two cost variances (variance due to
time and cost control variance). Data for each of these
variables has been presented in various tables. The next
chapter will attempt to document relationships between some
of these variables and production costs.
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III. TECHNOLOGY AND PRODUCTION COSTS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will test hypotheses between measures of
production costs and measures of technology. Regression
analysis was used for testing hypotheses and for constructing
measures of predicted production costs as a function of
measures of technology and development costs. The results
are presented in this chapter. This chapter will also
discuss cost control through comparison of actual production
costs with predicted production costs. The resulting cost
overruns and cost underruns will be used for hypotheses
testing in Chapter V.
B. HYPOTHESES TESTING
The data relevant to this portion of the analysis are
shown in Table 3.1. The reported R&D cost figures are
"nonrecurring" development costs provided by the Air Force
for each system. The costs are adjusted to constant 1986
dollars by using the OSD 3600 Escalation Index of prices for
development work. The production cost figures, also provided
by the Air Force, are adjusted to constant 1986 dollars by


































Advance Re(design Reach R&D Cost
0.01947 0.,37529 0.76986 73594
0.02398 0. 41191 0.93837 116580
0.01076 0,,26210 0.78737 37228
0.10584 0. 44910 0.93328 155523
0.00719 0.,10878 0.91366 32586
0.03647 0. 17506 0.82829 319499
0.05194 0.,27101 0.85233 91707
-0.01799 0. 25978 0.87590 64383
-0.02440 0,,13829 0.90234 121932
0.00867 0. 09139 0.80131 108085
0.05180 0,,21674 0.98883 14943
0. 18031 0.,21766 1.15432 180653
0.22497 0,,38644 1.14932 157820
0. 18782 0.,25399 1.04977 451274
Test of First Hypothesis
The first set of hypotheses concern the relationship
between production cost and technology measures. Can
production cost be explained directly from knowing the degree
of technological extension or complexity of a system? I have
hypothesized that because advance represents mainly the
"invention" aspect of the project or the increment in
technology from a predecessor satellite to the next one, it
will have only a limited affect on production costs. As
redesign had little affect on R&D costs it is hypothesized
that it will again have little affect on production costs.
On the other hand, reach represents the overall technological
extension of the system. While costs to advance or redesign
a system might reasonably be expected to cause R&D costs,
production costs to build the system might be more highly
26
correlated with the overall technological complexity as
reflected by reach. To test the first hypotheses a multiple
regression was run. The result was:
The regression equation:
PRODCOST = 182772 + 1138059 ADVANCE - 593915 REDESIGN + 68493 REACH
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio P
Constant 182772 558617 0.33 0,,750
ADVANCE 1138059 1008226 1.13 0. 285
REDESIGN -593915 402825 -1.47 0,,171
REACH 68493 624697 0.11 0,,915
s = 148655 R-sq = 36.2% R-sq(adj) = 17.1*
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F p
Regression 3 1.25511E+11 41836974080 1.89 0.195
Error 10 2.20982E+11 22098206720
Total 13 3.46493E+11





Obs. ADVANCE APROCOST Fit Stdev. Fit Residual St.Resid
R 0.180 594167 337766 91321 256401 2.19R
R denotes an obs. with a large st . resid.
Taken as a whole the regression is not very significant.
In addition, the coefficients for all three technology
variables are insignificant. The findings suggest no direct
relationship between production cost and the various measures
of technology.
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Test of Second Hypothesis
I have hypothesized that as development costs increase,
production costs will also increase, as high development
costs may indicate a more complex system, resulting in
increased production costs. To test this hypothesis a
regression was run with the following results:
The regression equation:
PRODCOST = 38745 + 0.904 R&DCOST
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio P
Constant 38745 53501 0.72 0.483
AR&DCOST 0.9040 0. 2990 3.02 0.011
s = 128024 R-sq = 43.2% R-sq(adj) = 38.5*
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F p
Regression 1 1.49813E+11 1.49813E+11 9.14 0.011
Error 12 1.96680E+11 16390017024
Total 13 3.46493E+11
Unusual Observations
Obs. AR&DCOST APR0C0ST Fit Stdev. Fit Residual St.Resid
R 180653 594167 202051 36562 392116 3 . 20R
I 451274 311833 446685 99847 -134852 -1.68X
R denotes an obs. with a large st. resid.
X denotes an obs. whose X value gives it large influence.
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Figure 3.1 R&D Cost Versus Production Cost in
Thousands of Dollars
The regression equation and plot indicate a strong
relationship between R&D costs and production costs. Costly
R&D indicates costly production. However, the data also
clearly indicate that system R is an outlier. System R was
eliminated and the regression run a second time. The
resulting regression equation and plot with system R
eliminated were as follows:
The regression equation:
APR0C0ST = 22055 + 0.804 AR&DC0ST
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p
Constant 22055 21660 1.02 0.330
AR&DC0ST 0.8036 0.1211 6.63 0.000
s = 51585 R-sq = 80.0% R-sq(adj) = 78.2%
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Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F p
Regression 1 1.17103E+11 1.17103E+11 44.01 0.000
Error 11 29271394304 2661035776
Total 12 1.46375E+11
Unusual Observations
Obs.AR&DCOST APROCOST Fit Stdev.Fit Residual St.Resid
M 319499 387034 278809 26615 108225 2.45R
I 451274 311833 384705 40984 -72872 -2.33X
R denotes an obs . with a large st. resid.
X denotes an obs. whose X value gives it large influence
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Figure 3.2 R&D Cost Versus Production Cost in
Thousands of Dollars
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Upon removing system R the results indicate an even
stronger relationship between the two variables. Adjusted R2
has increased from .38 to .78, consistent with system R
masking the strong underlying positive association between
R&D cost and production cost. In essence, the relationship
between R&D cost and production cost simply reflects the size
or scale of the programs.
A further question of interest is whether production cost
may in fact be related to technology, but the relationship is
hidden because of the failure to control for scale effects.
To test this idea, I constructed a ratio of R&D to
production cost (R&D cost/Production cost) labeled the
"Development Premium Ratio" . Variance in this ratio captures
variance in the relationship between development and
production cost while controlling for scale. The question of
interest is now whether variance in the development premium
ratio can be explained by the technological complexity of the
systems. The following reasoning suggests some possible
relationship
.
The outcome of a development project is the initial
prototype of each satellite system. The cost of this initial
system includes: (A) the "pure" development cost of
extending technology and (B) manufacturing costs associated
with construction. Pure development costs will be non-
recurring whereas construction costs will recur with each
additional unit produced.
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If the cost of developing a project required zero
extension of technology then pure development cost would be
zero and the cost of the initial system would be equal to the
cost of producing additional units. The resulting
development premium ratio would thus be equal to zero and
there would be no premium to extending technology. If the
opposite case is assumed where the cost of developing a
project requires a large extension of technology then the
pure development costs would be substantial. The development
cost premium would therefore be large with a development
premium ratio greater than zero. It can thus be
hypothesized that if the development cost premium is driven
by the technological complexity of the task, then the ratio
should be predictable using the technological measures of
advance, redesign and reach. Positive associations between
the development premium ratio and technology measures is
expected
.
Test of Third Hypothesis
I have hypothesized that because advance represents the
increment in technology from a predecessor satellite to the
next one, measured as the difference in reach between a
satellite and its predecessors, it will have a strong
relationship to the development premium ratio. The
regression results were as follows:
The regression equation:
Development Premium Ratio = 0.919 +3.11 ADVANCE
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Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio P
Constant 0.91931 0.09872 9.31 0.000
ADVANCE 3.110 1.094 2.64 0.016
s = 0.2887 R-sq = 42.4* R-sq(adj) = 37.1*
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F P
Regression 1 0.67371 0.67371 8.09 0.016
Error 11 0.91658 0.08333
Total 12 1.59030
Unusual Observations
Obs. ADVANCE DP Fit Stdev. Fit Residual St.Resid
L 0.011 1.6085 0.9528 0.0923 0.6558 2.40R
C 0.225 1.6838 1.6189 0.2046 0.0648 0.32X
R denotes an obs. with a large st. resid.
X denotes an obs. whose X value gives it large influence.
The regression is significant with a strong relationship
between advance and the development premium ratio. The
coefficient for advance is positive and significant.
Test of Fourth Hypothesis
As redesign represents tradeoffs made in the design
process between the four dimensions of technology as measured
in terms of a lateral shift along a technology hypersurface,
then it would again be hypothesized that there is a
relationship between redesign and the development premium
ratio. Since the cost of redesign should be less than the
cost of advance in technology, one would expect that, while
redesign should be positively associated with the development
premium ratio, the association should be smaller than that





Development Premium Ratio = 0.628 + 1.74 REDESIGN
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio P
Constant 0.6283 0.2221 2.83 0.016
REDESIGN 1.7408 0.7804 2.23 0.047
s = 0.3155 R-sq = 31.1* R-sq(adj) = 24.9*
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F P
Regression 1 0.49531 0.49531 4.98 0.047
Error 11 1.09498 0.09954
Total 12 1.59030
The regression is significant and redesign has a positive
coefficient, but that coefficient is smaller and less
significant than the one previously found for advance.
Test of Fifth Hypothesis
Reach represents the total technological complexity
embodied in an individual satellite measured as the distance
from the origin to the point (in 4-dimensional space) held by
each individual satellite. Reach captures the total
complexity, not the "invention" aspects of the development
program. Hence it is hypothesized that reach has little
effect on causing pure development costs and little
relationship with the development premium ratio. The
following regression indicates reach has little significance.
The regression equation:
Development Premium Ratio = 0.176 + 1.00 REACH
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio P
Constant 0.1759 0.8791 0.20 0.845
REACH 1 .0007 0.9629 1 .04 0.321
s = 0.3628 R-sq = 8.9* R-sq(adj) = 0.7*
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Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F P
Regression 1 0. 1422 0.1422 1.08 0.321
Error 11 1 .4481 0.1316
Total 12 1.5903
Unusual Observations
Obs. REACH DP Fit Stdev.Fit Residual St.Resid
C 1.15 1.684 1.326 0.254 0.358 1.38 X
X denotes an obs. whose X value gives it large influence.
A final multiple regression of advance, redesign and
reach was then run against the development premium ratio with
the following results:
The regression equation:
Development Premium Ratio = 2.27 + 4.58 ADVANCE + 0.885
REDESIGN - 1.83 REACH
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio P
Constant 2.267 1.013 2.24 0.052
ADVANCE 4.580 1.761 2.60 0.029
REDESIGN 0.8848 0.7246 1.22 0.253
REACH -1 .827 1.150 -1.59 0.147
s = 0.2594 R-sq = 61.9% R-sq(adj) = 49.2%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F p
Regression 3 0.98450 0.32817 4.88 0.028
Error 9 0.60580 0.06731
Total 12 1.59030





Obs. ADVANCE DP Fit Stdev.Fit Residual St.Resid
L 0.011 1.6085 1.1099 0.1170 0.4986 2.15R
R denotes an obs. with a large st . resid.
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This final regression confirms the individual hypotheses,
with advance being the most significant followed by redesign
and then reach. Note however that inclusion of the three
measures in the model has increased the R2 substantially from
any of the three models including only the individual
variables. Since our objective here is to maximally use the
measures to explain production cost, this multiple regression
model will be used to develop predicted production costs and
production variances to be used for hypotheses testing in
Chapter V.
C. DEVELOPMENT OF PRODUCTION COST VARIANCES
Production Cost Variances
In order to develop predicted production costs and
production variances, consider the information contained in
Table 3.2 below.
TABLE 3.2
CALCULATIONS FOR PERFORMANCE VARIANCES















Note: DPR=Development Premium Ratio
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H 50414 1,,45979 1 ,28194
142662 0,,81718 1 .02719
L 23144 1,,60854 1, . 10991
J 118752 1, , 30965 1 .44434
N 33798 0,,96414 ,72722
M 387034 ,82551 1 .07592
B 93932 0,,97631 1,.18776
Q 84144 .76515 .81446
P 169722 ,71842 .62932
E 162283 . 66603 .92383
K 17697 0,,84438 .88977
C 93730 1 .68377 1 . 53994
I 311833 1,,44717 1 .43443
In order to determine the systems' "predicted"
development premium ratio, a particular system's values for
advance, redesign and reach were entered into the multiple
regression equation. The system's predicted development
premium ratio was then divided into one, with the result
multiplied by the corresponding R&D cost in order to arrive
at "predicted" production cost. Note, the objective here is
to create measures of predicted production costs using
information available prior to actual production. This
approach in essence provides a predicted production cost
using known R&D costs and the three technology measures (also
known prior to production.)
The difference between actual production costs and
predicted production costs yielded the "production cost
variance". Minus figures are favorable, positive figures are
unfavorable. Finally, dividing the production cost variance
by the predicted production costs and multiplying by 100
resulted in the "percentage variance". Again, minus figures
are favorable.
The variances identified above have been shown
graphically in Figures 3.3 and 3.4.
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Figure 3.4 Percentage Variance
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In order to develop good cost control techniques, it is
important that the differences between predicted costs and
actual costs be explained. The next two chapters will
analyze relationships between cost control (as reflected in
the variance measures) and contractor financial condition in
order to determine if cost overruns /underruns are associated
with financial ratios.
D . SUMMARY
This chapter reported the results of testing hypotheses
between measures of production costs and measures of
technology, with positive results. The creation of predicted
production costs and the resultant variances provide measures
of cost control that will be further analyzed in Chapters IV
and V.
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IV. COST CONTROL AND FINANCIAL CONDITION
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter contains a discussion of the expected
relationships between financial condition of the satellite
system manufacturers and cost control , in order to suggest
why cost overruns/underruns may be associated with financial
ratios. A table of applicable financial ratios to be used
for hypotheses testing in Chapter V is also presented, along
with a discussion of the data collection process used to
obtain necessary information for the analyses presented in
Chapter V.
B. THE RELEVANCE OF FINANCIAL CONDITION
The production cost variances developed in Chapter III
represent cost overruns and underruns of the various systems
studied. If actual production costs were greater then the
predicted cost then the resultant variance indicates a
production cost overrun. If on the other hand the actual
production cost is less then the predicted cost, the variance
would indicate a production cost underrun. In order to
predict what financial factors of a prospective government
contractor may indicate the likelihood of either exceeding or
falling below the "norm" for production cost, it is
important to look at the financial factors that would tend to
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indicate a contractor's propensity to experience production
cost overruns or underruns.
The concept of examining financial status by examining
the various financial ratios that can be computed using data
obtained from published annual financial reports is not new.
By looking at relationships between traditional balance sheet
and income statement financial data and their possible
influence on production, various hypotheses to explain
overruns/underruns will be developed. Financial ratios
calculated from accounting data contained in financial
reports for contractors will be used to represent financial
factors or aspects of financial condition. These ratios will
be calculated using data from the contract year of each
system under study. Hence the data are available prior to
actual production.
Financial ratio analysis is a common analytical tool for
observing and evaluating the financial condition of the firm.
While financial ratio analysis is common, the objective in
looking at financial ratios here is non-traditional. Most
treatments of ratio analysis presume that the objective of
the ratio analysis is to assess the future profitability or
risk of a firm. The current objective is more narrowly
focused. Ratios will be used as indicators of conditions
that may influence production effectiveness or efficiency and
consequently have some association with cost overruns and
cost underruns.
42
C. ASPECTS OF FINANCIAL CONDITION
It is possible to categorize financial ratios in many
ways. However, several finance and accounting references
categorize financial ratios into broad categories
representing separate aspects of financial condition as
follows: [Ref. 3]
1. Profitability (return on investment)
2. Short-term liquidity
3. Solvency (capital structure)
4. Activity (efficiency or turnover)
5. Capital goods investment
To simplify the process of analyzing a firm's financial
condition, with the goal of predicting the tendency towards
production cost overruns/underruns , it is suggested that
production costs may depend on these five aspects of
financial condition and the specific ratios associated with
them. By examining these five aspects of a firm it may be
possible to predict a particular firm's propensity towards
production cost overruns or underruns prior to a contract
being awarded to that firm.
What follows are arguments for links between the five
aspects of financial condition and production capability or
efficiency. In each case reasons why financial condition may
be associated with cost overruns or underruns are discussed.
In some cases alternative, even contradictory arguments are
offered. The objective here is to explain the possible ways
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that financial condition may influence production. Actual
relationships between financial condition and production cost
control for the sample will be addressed in the report of
analysis presented in Chapter V.
Profitability . Because the government often includes
penalties for failure to meet specified delivery dates or
cost targets, a firm that has shown low profits in the
government contractor arena may have experienced past cost
overruns or production delays with penalties that reduced
profits. This may be an indication of either poor, or
unrealistic, production projections or possibly inadequate
research and development efforts prior to production. This
leads to the hypothesis that low profitability may indicate
conditions in which cost incurrence has been poorly managed
in the past and, consequently, may reflect a higher
propensity for cost overruns on future jobs. For similar
reasons, relatively high profitability may signal future cost
underruns because of the possibility that higher
profitability indicates good past delivery performance, with
more dollars available for investment and expansion in
production facilities, leading to more efficient production.
On the other hand, excessive profits or consistently high
profits may indicate that contractor operations have been
successful in the recent past, indicating less need for new
business. The contractor is therefore in a stronger
negotiating position (assuming non-competitive negotiation)
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and can demand a higher price. These "excess" profits (costs
to the government) lead to an alternative hypothesis
concerning profitability in that high profits may indicate a
tendency towards cost overruns.
Short Term Liquidity . Short term liquidity ratios
reflect a firm's ability to meet short term financial
obligations. These ratios are of major concern to the
satellite contractor's suppliers and creditors.
New and updated products may require substantial outlays
to finance inventories and production start-up costs. A
critical concern in meeting any production schedule is the
availability of raw materials and inventory. Because of the
perception by the firm's suppliers of greater risk of
default, contractors with poor short term liquidity may be
more likely to suffer inventory delays and the associated
higher costs (less attractive payment /credit terms). This
leads to a hypothesis that a firm with poor liquidity is more
likely to have production cost overruns.
An alternative hypothesis is also possible. "Excessive"
liquidity may be due to high investment in current assets.
Current assets are non-productive assets, such as receivables
and inventory, and may lead to excessive carrying costs of
inventory or lost opportunity cost of funds tied up in
receivables. This argument then suggests the hypothesis that
high liquidity may be associated with cost overruns.
Furthermore, high liquidity is also consistent with high
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working capital. Under typical negotiated contracts, the
contractor is compensated for carrying working capital. High
working capital, therefore, may lead to a higher price and
cost overruns.
Solvency . Solvency ratios indicate a firm's ability to
meet long-term obligations, both financial and operational.
This is the "risk" of a contractor's capital structure and
debt repayment ability. Solvency ratios relate long-term
debt to various assets or debt expense (interest) to the
resources available to pay it. If a firm is experiencing
high risk it may be more constrained in production capacity
due to the high cost of capital goods financing. This
limiting effect reduces the firm's flexibility in production
and may even require higher product prices to cover higher
debt costs. It is therefore hypothesized that poorer
solvency may indicate production cost overruns.
An alternative hypothesis is also possible here. "Good"
solvency implies low debt financing, but low debt could
indicate insufficient purchases of capital goods to stay
competitive with the rest of the industry. If low debt is an
indirect indicator of insufficient investment in capital
goods, then "good" solvency could be consistent with "poor"
production capability and consequently be suggestive of
future production inefficiencies. This would lead to the
hypothesis that a firm with too little debt would experience
production cost overruns.
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Activity (Efficiency or Turnover). The "activity" ratios
are measured using a sales figure in the numerator and a
selected asset figure in the denominator. Thus they relate
the amount of resources generated during a period (sales)
with assets available to generate the sales. By the very
nature of these ratios, measures of specific asset
operational or turnover efficiencies are obtained, showing
the degree to which resources or capacity are being utilized.
Firms that are fully utilizing existing capacity may be
constrained and therefore may be riskier in terms of the
flexibility required to meet technologically challenging
production. If this is the case, it is hypothesized that
firms with high turnover rates may be more likely to
experience production cost overruns because of the
constraints associated with operating at full capacity.
Alternatively, firms that know how to consistently
utilize their resources to maximum potential may be more
likely to be able to accurately predict and deliver on a
challenging production schedule. If this is the case, it is
hypothesized that the more efficient a firm, the more likely
the firm is to meet production cost projections. High
activity/efficiency ratios would therefore be expected to be
associated with production cost underruns
.
Capital Goods Investment . Capital goods investment is
the largest single asset on the books for most large
manufacturing corporations. It is expected that efficient
47
and competitive firms would be required to invest in capital
goods on a continuing basis to both offset depreciation and
to keep up with modern manufacturing techniques. This
implies major investment in capital goods to be a constant
requirement. Outdated or inefficient production facilities
could increase costs and result in cost overruns. This would
lead to the hypothesis that cost overruns would be more
likely if investment ratios are low.
Alternatively, a high level of investment may indicate
that a substantial upgrade of production cost facilities has
occurred, perhaps due to under investment in the past. Newer
assets typically have a higher cost than the ones they
replace. This higher cost must be assigned to products
produced and thus may lead to increases in the cost of those
products. Consequently a high level of investment may be
indicative of future cost overruns.
D. SELECTION OF RATIOS
Although many more ratios can be calculated from data
available through income statements and balance sheets, the
following 23 ratios were considered to be sufficiently
comprehensive to represent the five aspects of financial
condition for the satellite manufacturing firms.
The ratios and abbreviations that will be used for
hypotheses testing in Chapter V are presented in Table 4-1
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1. Return on Assets (ROA)
2. Return on Equity (ROE)
3. Return on Capital (ROC)
4. Profit Margin (PM)
LIQUIDITY
5. Current Ratio (CR)
6. Quick Ratio (QR)
7. Current Asset Ratio (CAR)





Non-Curr. Liab + S.H. Equity
Net Income/Sales
Curr. Assets/Curr. Liab.
(Cash ± Mkt Sec. +Acct. Rec.)
Curr. Liab.
Curr. Assets/Total Assets
(Curr. Assets - Curr. Liab.)
Total Assets
SOLVENCY
9. Debt Ratio (DR)
10. Equity to Debt ( ETD
)
11. Curr. Debt Ratio (CDR)
12. Non-Curr. Debt Ratio (NCDR)
13. Debt to Plant Equip. (DP&E)
ACTIVITY/EFFICIENCY
14 .Receivables Turnover (RT)
15. Asset Turnover (AT)
16. Plant Asset Turnover (PAT)
17. Inventory Turnover (IT)
18. Working Cap. Turnover (WCT)
INVESTMENT
Total Liab. /Total Assets
S.H. Equity/Total Liab.
Curr. Liab. /Total Assets
Non-Curr. Liab. /Total Assets




Cost of Goods Sold/Inventory
Sales/ (Curr. Assets-Curr. Liab)
19 . Investment to
20 . Investment to





Investment/ (Net Income + Dep.)
Investment/Total Assets
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22 . Investment to Plant (IP) Investment/Plant & Equipment
23 . Investment to Deprec. (ID) Investment/Depreciation Exp.
E. DATA COLLECTION
To obtain needed financial data for hypotheses testing to be
reported in Chapter V, a library search was conducted to locate
contract year 10-K financial reports of the publicly traded firms
involved in the manufacturing of the satellite system. 10-K
reports for the contract year were available for companies which
manufactured eight different systems (B, C, E, I , L,M,N and Q) . Data
for system R were not collected because it was deleted as an
outlier in the analysis reported in Chapter III. Data for the
remaining five systems (H,J,K,0,P) were unavailable from public
sources because the contractors were privately held firms at the
time of the contract. After contacting each firm's customer
relations department, only financial data for system K could be
obtained. Unfortunately, the loss of four systems reduced the
sample size considerably and may have had an adverse affect on
subsequent hypotheses testing.
In general, the objective is to determine if financial
aspects can explain variations in production costs/efficiencies
in a manner consistent with previously stated relationships. By
using ratios closely related to those commonly found in
accounting and financial statement analysis text books,
assessment of various aspects influencing cost and efficien-
cies can be pursued. Therefore, the principal objective is to
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establish financial ratios that will serve as measures of the
previously discussed aspects of financial condition.
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V. HYPOTHESES TESTING: COST CONTROL AND FINANCIAL CONDITION
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will report the results of tests of
hypotheses developed in Chapter IV, to determine if cost
overruns/underruns are associated with financial ratios.
Because of the resultant small sample size from which the
hypotheses testing must be conducted, only correlation and
plots were used to test the data. Multivariate regression
analysis was to be the test of choice, but the small sample
size could lead to erroneous conclusions.
B. SUMMARY OF DATA
The following table is a compilation of all the ratios
extrapolated from the 10-K financial reports of the satellite
manufacturers, measured at the contract year. It should be
noted that all percentage ratios are expressed as a















070 .059 .071 .056 .043 .014 -.016 .077 .053
142 . 142 . 159 . 164 .145 .035 -.041 .177 .118
108 .084 .104 .074 .056 .022 -.025 .127 .072
039 .041 .045 .078 .067 .013 -.010 .059 .033
37 1 .94 1 .80 1 .76 1 .82 2.02 2.06 1 .45 2 .00
303 .824 .942 .989 .894 .446 .923 .940 .833
478 .565 .569 .556 .555 .688 .752 .555 .547
128 . 274 . 254 .240 .250 .347 .499 . 173 .272
506 .580 . 551 .734 .777 .593 .617 .554 .555
TABLE 5.1 (cont'd)
ETD .978 .724 .815 .461 .379 .685 .621 .787 .803
CDR .350 .291 .316 .316 .306 .341 .366 .382 .275
NCDR .156 .289 .235 .419 .471 .253 .251 .172 .279
DP&E 1.26 2 .00 1 .89 2 .79 3 .07 3.30 4.19 1 .99 1 .31
RT 24.1 6 .93 7 .75 3 .17 3 .24 8.70 5.65 5 .78 8 .03
AT 1.78 1 .46 1 .57 .715 .630 1.11 1.65 1 .30 1 .60
PAT 4.43 5 .06 5 .37 2 .72 2 .49 6.20 :LI. 20 4 .68 3 .78
IT 5.31 3 .63 4 .62 6 .39 7 .93 2.05 3.69 6 .02 4 .18
WCT 4.43 5 .34 6 .18 2 .98 2 .53 3.21 3.30 7 .55 5 .87
IS .009 .011 .015 .028 .038 .024 .024 .008 .011
IF .161 .171 .205 .159 .219 .539 3.16 .092 .193
IA .017 .017 .023 .020 .024 .027 .040 .011 .018
IP .043 .058 .080 .076 .095 .150 .269 .039 .042
ID .461 .431 .551 .285 .359 .756 1.40 .267 .446
C. HYPOTHESES TESTING
Before reviewing the test results, it is important to
note that because of the limited sample size, any conclusion
drawn by the results are not conclusive but rather are at
best, indications of tendencies represented by the data.
Analysis of Profitability
To test the first hypothesis concerning profitability
ratios and their effect on production cost
overruns/underruns , a correlation and plot of production
variance versus the individual profit ratios were conducted
with the following results:
SYS VAR R0A ROE ROC PM
Q 064 070 142 108 039
E 387 059 0. 142 084 041
I -0 009 071 159 104 045
B 217 056 0. 164 074 078
L -0 310 043 145 056 067
N -0 246 014 0. 035 022 013
M 303 -0 016 -0 041 -0 025 -0 .010
C -0 085 077 177 127 059
K 054 053 118 072 .033
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The results are rather inconclusive but the plots
indicate that system M is an outlier. System M was therefore
eliminated and the regression and plots were run a second
time. The results were as follows:
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With the outlier removed the profitability ratios appear
to be more strongly related to production variances. The
positive correlation indicates that firms with high profits
tend to have production cost overruns. This is consistent
with one of the hypotheses developed in Chapter IV: high
profitability implies that a contractor is financially sound
and can afford to negotiate from a strong position. The
strong negotiation position may permit the contractor to
negotiate a higher price than if it were in a weaker
position. Thus the higher price is reflected in a higher





The short term liquidity ratios were the next set of data
to be run against the production cost variances to determine
their effect on production cost overruns/underruns . The
results were as follows:
SYS VAR CR QR CAR WCR
Q 064 1 .37 303 0.478 0.128
E 387 1 .94 824 0.565 0.274
I -0 009 1 .80 942 0.569 0.254
B 217 1 .76 989 0.556 0.240
L -0 310 1 .82 894 0.555 0.250
N -0 246 2 .02 446 0.688 0.347
M 303 2 .06 923 0.752 0.499
C -0 085 1 .45 940 0.555 0.173
K 054 2 .00 833 0.547 0.272
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The resulting positive correlation between the short term
liquidity ratios and the production cost variances indicate a
tendency for high liquidity to be associated with production cost
overruns. This is consistent with the hypothesis that a firm
with high liquidity may have a high investment in current assets.
Because current assets, such as receivables and inventory, are
non-productive assets, this may lead to excessive carrying costs
of inventory or lost opportunity cost of funds tied up in
receivables. Furthermore, high liquidity is also consistent with
high working capital. Under typical negotiated contracts, the
contractor is compensated for carrying working capital. High





The next set of ratios to be analyzed were the solvency
ratios. Correlation and plot results follow:
SYS VAR DR ETD CDR NCDR DPE
Q 0.064 0.506 0.978 0.350 0.156 1.26
E 0,,387 0.580 0,,724 0.291 0.289 2,.00
I -0.,009 0.551 0.,815 0.316 0.235 1,,89
B 0,,217 0.734 0,,461 0.316 0.419 2 .79
L -0,,310 0.777 0,,379 0.306 0.471 3 .07
N -0,,246 0.593 0,,685 0.341 0.253 3 .30
M 0,,303 0.617 0,,621 0.366 0.251 4 .19
C -0,,085 0.554 0,.787 0.382 0.172 1 .99
K 0.,054 0.555 0,,803 0.275 0.279 1 .31
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Again the correlations were not very high, but the signs
are consistent. As debt increases there is a tendency toward
incurring cost underruns. Although firms with higher debt
are generally considered to be less solvent, the ability of a
firm to finance via debt instead of equity may be an
indication that creditors consider the assets of the firm as
being more productive (better able to generate revenues to
service the debt). Assets that are more productive (i.e.
more efficient, more modern) may then be more effective in
controlling costs, leading to lower production costs. Such




The activity ratios (turnover efficiency with which
resources or capacity are being utilized) were the next set
of measures to be tested. The following results yielded
mixed conclusions:
SYS VAR RT AT PAT IT WCT
Q 0.064 24.1 1.780 4.43 5..31 4.43
E 0.387 6.93 1 .460 5.06 3,,63 5.34
I -0.009 7.75 1 .570 5.37 4,,62 6.18
B 0.217 3.17 0.715 2.72 6,,39 2.98
L -0.310 3.24 0.630 2.49 7.,93 2.53
N -0.246 8.70 1 . 110 6.20 2,.05 3.21
M 0.303 5.65 1.650 11.20 3,,69 3.30
C -0.085 5.78 1 .300 4 .68 6,,02 7.55
K 0.054 8.03 1.600 3.78 4.,18 5.87
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With the exception of the inventory turnover ratio, the
remaining activity ratios indicate a tendency for firms with high
activity ratios to have cost overruns. This could be an
indication that, although contractors are using their existing
assets efficiently, they are operating at full capacity. The
contractors may be constrained and are thus not as flexible as
they might otherwise be. Constraints on operations could lead to
the observed cost overruns.
On the other hand, the inventory turnover ratio indicates
that a firm that efficiently turns over its inventory is
efficiently managing its inventory, reducing carrying costs,
leading to cost underruns. High inventory turnover also is
consistent with a greater ability of firms to deliver on a
production schedule, resulting in cost underruns.
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Investment Analysis
The final analysis concerns the capital goods investment
ratios. Correlation and plots for each ratio follow: (Two
plots for ratio IS are shown. The reason for this will be
explained following the plots.)
SYS VAR IS IF IA IP ID
Q 0,,064 0,,009 0. , 161 0,,017 0,,043 0.461
E 0,.387 0,,011 0,,171 .017 0,.058 0.431
I -0,,009 0,,015 0.,205 0,,023 0,,080 0.551
B 0,,217 0,,028 0,,159 .020 0,.076 0.285
L -0,,310 0,,038 0. 219 0,,024 0,,095 0.359
N -0,,246 0,,024 0,,539 .027 0,,150 0.756
M 0,,303 0,,024 3. 160 0,,040 0,,269 1.400
C -0,,085 0,,008 0,,092 0,.011 0,.039 0.267
K 0.,054 0.,011 0, 193 0,,018 0,,042 0.446
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The results indicated a tendency for firms with more
investment in capital goods to produce systems with cost
overruns. This finding is consistent with one of the
hypotheses. A large investment may indicate the replacing of
older assets which, although more modern, are more expensive.
When the higher cost of the newer assets is assigned to the
product, higher production cost follows and cost overruns
result
.
The only exception to this was the investment to sales
ratio. Further examination of the plot indicated that
systems L and N were outliers. System L and N were
eliminated and the plot and correlation was run a second
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time. The association was then positive, corresponding to
the results of the other investment ratios.
D . SUMMARY
This chapter reported the results of testing of
hypotheses between cost control (as reflected in the variance
measures) and contractor financial condition, with varied
results. It is again stressed that the limited sample size
allows only the observation of general tendencies and does
not permit a multivariate analysis which would have resulted
in better control over the analysis of statistical
relationships. On the positive side, the findings for the
individual ratios within each category were generally
consistent and some broad tendencies were observable in the data.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this thesis was twofold: (A) to determine
relationships between advances in technology and production
costs, for a sample of satellite systems, and (B) to
determine relationships between contractor financial
condition and control of production costs. Accomplishment of
these goals involved the following steps:
Chapter I introduced the thesis objective and provided a
background and motivation for the study. In addition, the
chapter briefly reviewed Dr. Greer's study as well as
described the differences between his study and this thesis,
with particular emphasis on production costs and cost control
versus contractor financial condition. The chapter concluded
with a detailed organization of the thesis.
Chapter II involved a detailed review of Dr. Greer's
study. The intent of this chapter was to gain an
understanding of Dr. Greer's methods of sample and data
collection, the procedures he used to arrive at technology
measures and the relationships he established between
technology and development cost. As a similar analysis was
to be conducted using production costs, it was important to
understand the relationships between technology extension and
development costs. Dr. Greer's analysis provided three
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measures of technology or technology extension (advance,
redesign and reach) , three measures of development cost
(actual, ex ante, and estimated based on actual time) and two
cost variances (variance due to time and cost control
variance). The chapter concluded by providing the new
measures of production costs to be used for hypotheses
testing in Chapter III.
Chapter III reported the results of testing of
hypotheses between measures of production costs and measures
of technology, with significant results. No direct
relationship between technology measures and production cost
was found. However, production cost was found to be strongly
related to development cost and the ratio of development cost
to production cost was found to be significantly related to
measures of technology. Development cost was larger,
relative to production cost, when a large technological
advance was required in developing a system. Of importance
in this chapter was the construction of measures of predicted
production costs as a function of measures of technology and
development costs. In order to develop good cost control, it
is important that the differences between predicted costs and
actual costs be explained. The creation of the predicted
production costs and the resultant variances provided
measures of cost control that were further analyzed in
Chapters IV and V.
75
Chapter IV presented an analysis of the expected
relationships between financial condition of the satellite
system manufacturer and cost control. The objective was to
suggest why cost overruns /underruns may be associated with
financial ratios. In this chapter alternative, sometimes
contradictory, arguments were offered for why each of the
five aspects of financial condition might influence
production cost and hence explain production cost variance.
The five aspects of financial condition discussed were
profitability, leverage, liquidity, activity and capital
investment. The discussion suggested why these aspects of
financial condition might affect a contractor's production
capability or efficiency. The chapter concluded with a
discussion of the data collection process used to obtain the
necessary information for the analysis conducted in Chapter
V.
Chapter V reported the results of testing of hypotheses
developed in Chapter IV, in order to determine if cost
overruns/underruns are associated with financial ratios.
When testing profitability ratios, there was a tendency
for a firm with high profits to incur cost overruns. This is
consistent with the hypothesis that a contractor that is
financially sound can afford to negotiate from a strong




In analyzing liquidity, there was a tendency for highly
liquid firms to overrun production costs. This is consistent
with the hypothesis that a firm with high liquidity may have
a high investment in current assets. Because current assets,
such as receivables and inventory, are non-productive assets,
this may lead to excessive carrying costs of inventory or
lost opportunity cost of funds tied up in receivables. The
high liquidity is also consistent with high working capital.
Under typical negotiated contracts, the contractor is
compensated for carrying working capital. High working
capital therefore, leads to a higher price and cost overruns.
When long term debt was tested the results indicated that
as debt increased there was a tendency towards observing cost
underruns. This suggests that the ability of a firm to
finance via debt instead of equity may be an indication that
creditors consider the assets of the firm as being more
productive. More productive assets may create efficiencies
in controlling costs.
When testing activity ratios, mixed results were
obtained. With the exception of the inventory turnover
ratio, the remaining activity ratios indicated a tendency for
firms with high activity ratios to have cost overruns.
Interpreting turnover ratios is uncertain. A high turnover
ratio is sometimes viewed as an indicator of efficient
operations. However, a high turnover ratio is also
consistent with a firm operating near full capacity.
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Operating at full capacity may place constraints on further
production, resulting in the cost overruns observed. The
inventory turnover ratio however, indicated that a firm that
efficiently turns over its inventory may be better able to
deliver on a production schedule, resulting in cost
underruns
.
The final analysis concerned the capital goods investment
ratios. Results indicated a tendency for firms with more
investment in capital goods to produce systems with cost
overruns. This was consistent with the hypothesis that a
large investment may indicate the replacing of older assets
with newer assets which are more expensive. The higher costs
of the new assets result in higher production costs and
therefore cost overruns.
B . RECOMMENDAT IONS
The conclusions reached by this thesis suggest two
recommendations
.
From a cost estimation point of view, the analysis aides
in the determination of future production costs for satellite
technology advances. It is important for a cost estimator to
understand the relationships between the overall
technological complexity of the system and the resulting
effects on production costs. If this is understood than a
model could be used to develop predicted production costs
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which could be used as an aide for enhanced cost control
techniques/systems
.
From the government's point of view, understanding the
effects the contractor's financial condition has on its
ability to meet costs is of importance. Based on the
tendencies discussed in this thesis, the government should
review the financial health of a firm prior to entering into
a contract in order to determine its propensity towards cost
overruns /underruns . However, it is important to once again
note that because of the limited sample size, any conclusion
drawn by the results are not conclusive but are, at best,
indications of tendencies in the data.
This limitation in data was the major obstacle
encountered when conducting this research. It is therefore
recommended that any further study involving the analysis of
financial ratios be conducted with a sample size large enough
to avoid the possibility of developing erroneous conclusions.
A further benefit of a larger sample size would be the
possibility of additional testing to include multivariate
regression. This technique would result in better control
over the analysis of statistical relationships.
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